the conflict and the urgent need to find a solution -the national press dispatched a large number of Bangkok-based reporters to the south in a clear sign that editors regarded the issue as a top priority. Subsequently a number of journalists made repeated trips to the south for several years to cover the conflict. However, when neither the heavy handed measures of the Thaksin government, nor the "soft approach" and new policies of his successor Prime Minister General (retired) Surayud Chulanont failed to yield results, press interest in the conflict dissipated. The Thai authorities subsequently admitted that the insurgency could drag on for decades, and the Thai public came to accept that a quick solution to the problem would not be found.
1 As a consequence, the southern unrest, while it remained an important issue, ceased to be a priority or "hot news" item.
Most newspapers in Bangkok have now streamlined their coverage of the southern conflict, and withdrawn their Bangkok-based reporters assigned to cover the issue. For a number of reporters still interested in the topic, obtaining permission from their editors to travel to the south has become more difficult, except to cover important anniversaries such as the 2004 Krue Se or Tak Bai incidents. However, special reports on these occasions serve only as a reminder of past events or, at best, a reflection of the change of mood; they do not, in any way, provide new insights into the dynamics of the ongoing conflict. Currently there are only a handful of knowledgeable reporters willing to work on the topic, and these reporters have generally been preoccupied with the political crisis in Bangkok which is seen as a more pressing matter. Some editors claim that they have reduced their coverage of the conflict because there are no new angles to present. For instance, according to Pakpoom Pongpai, news editor of Matichon Daily: "It's saturated. It has begun to repeat itself and there is no new angle. At the same time we have politics as the hot issue -not that it completely takes over the south issue. It's mainly because the south topic itself doesn't move."
2 The editors of the Bangkok Post and Kom Chad Luek have expressed similar views, while Pornchai Punnawattanaporn, the deputy editor of the Daily News Daily, has opined that "I don't think there is anything else about the south that we can cover." 3 The current political crisis in Bangkok is undeniably very important, but exclusive coverage of this issue deprives the public of news on other major challenges facing the country. Moreover, as regards the lack of new developments in the south and the so-called "saturated coverage" that some editors point to, they are mainly refering to socio-cultural issues such as poverty, economic underdevelopment, identity issues and how the conflict impacts the lives of ordinary people. Some reporters have covered these issues continuously since 2004, and their stories have become repetitive. 4 However, the problem with the press not being able to discern new angles has less to do with the insurgency itself than with their working practices. The Thai press relies heavily on a Bangkok centered system whereby stories filed by a handful of journalists in the capital and other major cities make it to the front pages, while those written by regional stringers receive much less attention. When major stories develop outside of the capital, the usual practice is for editors to send reporters from Bangkok to cover them. Bangkok-based reporters will often collaborate with local reporters to obtain more in-depth details and colour. Coverage of major stories outside the capital therefore requires more resources, and the longer the story continues the more expensive it becomes, as was the case in the early years of the insurgency. As public interest wanes, editors feel unable to justify the continued allocation of limited resources.
The Issara News Centre: A Short-lived Success
When violence re-emerged in the far south in early 2004, the media treated the issue as their most important story and accordingly allocated significant resources to it. In most cases, reporters from Bangkok worked on special assignments or on their own initiative, while local reporters covered violent incidents and helped facilitate their colleagues from the capital by, for example, introducing them to the right sources and providing translation services. In the context of the southern insurgency, this practice worked well because of the special needs of the Bangkok-based reporters. The historical background, cultural and religious differences, and the local Malay dialect all made the three provinces a totally different news landscape for reporters from Bangkok. As with most Thais, many Bangkokbased reporters struggled to cope with the fundamentals of life in the southern border provinces, such as the multitude of actors and agendas, and how society functions there. Yet the most difficult challenge they faced was to maintain their objectivity in the face of violent attacks against their co-religionalists, Thai Buddhists. Meanwhile, local reporters benefitted from this system through their exposure to colleagues from the national press, for unlike other parts of Thailand the south is not well served by the mainstream media. This meant that local reporters had limited opportunities to connect with the rest of the country. The reporting system therefore allowed national and local reporters to pool their resources and learn from each other.
The best example of this mode of cooperation was the Issara News Centre (INC). The INC was established in 2005 by the Thai Journalists Accociation (TJA) to cover the unfolding conflict with financial support from the National Reconciliation Committee (NRC), which wanted to encourage more constructive and objective reporting on the conflict by the media. The main purpose of the INC was to address the problem of outside journalists who lacked in-depth knowledge and on the ground experience of the south's unique problems. One practice was for reporters to pair up -Malay Muslim and Thai Buddhist, local and Bangkok-based -in an attempt to foster greater understanding of varying perspectives. Another practice was for Malay Muslim reporters to cover incidents involving Thai Buddhists. 6 This approach was deemed relatively successful in breaking down mutual prejudices. 7 In addition it allowed Bangkok correspondents to better understand the complexity of the problem and build up a network of contacts. It also helped transfer journalistic skills from Bangkok-based reporters to local correspondents, many of whom would later become responsible for providing coverage of the conflict to the national press. In short, the INC acted as a learning centre for both national and local reporters. More importantly perhaps, the INC helped lessen the influence of Bangkok-based editorial departments whose partisanship tended to distort reports, replacing them with local reporters and editors who better understood cultural mores in the far south.
The INC inititiave brought hope to those who wished to see changes in the practices of the Thai media, and the Centre was praised for its initial successes, including coverage of the 2005 Tanyong Limo incident in which two Thai marines were killed. McCargo endorsed the work of the INC as the first step towards collective agreement among the Thai press to a set of practices that would provide more balanced coverage of the conflict. 8 In her study of the INC, however, Supapohn Kanweerayothin opined that while the Centre was a good starting point, the effort was not sustainable because of its dependence on personalities and personal connections rather than on robust structural arrangements. Nevertheless, both McCargo and Supapohn praised the INC for providing a good learning process for journalists and something which could be built upon. Considering the limited experience of the Thai media in covering internal conflicts, the INC project resulted in unprecedented cooperation and pooling of resources among usually competitive news agencies.
Unfortunately, the decision in 2007 by the TJA to reduce the INC's budget and withdraw Bangkok-based journalists led to changes in the Centre's working practices. The decision to cut the budget was driven by differences in opinions between the INC and Bangkok-based editors, compounded by personality clashes.
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Initially the INC had focused more on the human interest stories such as identity issues and the impact of the violence on the local population, the kind of stories some of the editors in Bangkok felt were monotonous and would have preferred the INC to concentrate more on "hard news". In essence, the lack of support from editors in Bangkok left the INC with only a handful of reporters, with most working from home and being paid by piece.
11 Although the INC continues to coach a few local journalists, it is no longer an important training ground for reporters or an experimental instrument for the Thai press on how to handle a conflict of the scale and nature of the southern insurgency. While some Bangkokbased reporters formerly with the INC continue to write about the issue, in general, press coverage of the south has been left in the hands of local stringers who tend to focus on the daily incidents of violence.
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The Thai press is well known for its sensationalization of news, as this approach increases readership and hence sales. But while violence and human interest dramas may have kept press circulation high, such coverage has been criticized for not improving public understanding of the structural nature of the conflict. 13 Such coverage reflects the long-standing habits of the Thai press. As Anupong Chaiyarit, senior editor at TV Thai has noted: "The Thai media focuses on the very same thing they have been doing all along; the violence".
14 As a result, press reporting on the conflict has often been relegated to the crime sections of some newspapers.
Apart from the focus on violent incidents, the press has a tendency to focus on high-profile developments such as new government initiatives or public speeches and seminars. This "action led" reporting comes at the expense of in-depth investigative reporting.
15
This is despite the fact that a number of major issues go unreported, such as the large number of people awaiting trial and allegations of human rights abuses committed by military personnel. 16 Attempts by sectors of civil society in the far south to engage the press on these issues have thus far been unsuccessful. Overall, the press seems content to wait for major developments to break, such as on the issue of autonomy or the outcome of unofficial negotations with insurgent leaders.
The Limits of Reporting the Conflict as "Routine"
Covering "routine" incidents has become the main activity of journalists based in the far south. Previously reporters would monitor police radio broadcasts and rush to the scene of the incident to obtain photographs. However, this practice was changed after a reporter on the scene of one incident was killed by a secondary bomb blast. 17 Nowadays, most journalists wait until the scene of the incident has been declared safe, or they simply refrain from visiting. For safety reasons many editors have instructed their reporters not to travel to the so-called "red zones" late at night, i.e. areas of high insurgent activity.
18 As a result, many incidents in those areas go unreported. The dangers associated with covering the conflict means that journalists have increasingly come to rely on information provided by government or security officials, some of whom have been accused of furnishing reporters with inaccurate or biased information. 19 As a result, the local population has come to view media reportage of the conflict as misleading, and, more seriously, percieve journalists as being aligned with the authorities. This was highlighted in September 2005 when, following the shooting of villagers and the death of two soldiers at Tanyong Limo village, Narathiwat, local residents refused to speak with the Thai media and asked for reporters from Malaysia to be brought in. Villagers reportedly accused Thai journalists of being on the side of the soldiers. 20 Conversely, reporters have also been accused by the authorities of glorifying the activities of the militants (based on inaccurate information provided over police radios).
21 As a result, the media's credibility among locals, officials and militants alike has been greatly undermined. Some journalists fear they may have become targets of assasination by both the security services and the militants.
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As coverage of the conflict has become routine, and as large media organizations withdraw their staff from the south, editors have come to increasingly rely on local stringers. This has given rise to several problems. Not all of these stingers are journalists by profession; some are involved in business or even politics. 23 This has meant that the line between journalism and other activities has become blurred. Moreover, as stringers are generally paid by piece there is a tendency for them to produce stories which can easily be sold to Bangkok-based media outlets. Again, this means that the focus has been on violent incidents or human interest stories rather than on in-depth reporting. Moreover, local stringers also lack proper medical or life insurance, which means that they are reluctant to put themselves in dangerous situations. In other parts of the world journalists are provided with training to prepare themselves for the dangers they might face in conflict zones. However, in Thailand very few journalists receive such training. The Thai Army has provided some journalists with bullet proof vests, but this has only reinforced the perception that the press is aligned with the military. In addition, some Bangkok-based editors are reluctant to assign major stories to local stringers because they are not in full control of their stringers' activities, and thus prefer to leave major breaking stories to their own Bangkok-based journalists.
Local stringers often feel caught between the Bangkok-based newspapers and the provincial authorities. When they encounter problems, they complain that editors in Bangkok do not provide sufficient support. Local reporters also complain of undue pressure from provincial officials, as well as from militants, to report their side of the conflict. As a result, stringers often ignore stories which they consider might put their safety, or those of their families, at risk. The key to safety for many local reporters is simply to feign ignorance of the "truth", or not to seek it out at all. One local reporter, for instance, attributed her survival to not seeking to discover who is behind the violence, while another remarked "There is no one to speak about the truth on the situation. Even if I know of it I would not (speak about it). I'm afraid of the 'unseen power'. There's no one to protect me." 24 Few local reporters are proud of their status as a reporter: as one local reporter told the author, "I'm just somebody begging for information trying to make a living."
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In addition to the personal risks faced by stringers, limited resources poses another problem in the conduct of their work. Trying to ascertain the identity and motives of attackers not only requires large amounts of time and energy, but also navigating an environment filled with prejudice, suspicion, distrust and, more importantly, deception. The 2005 Tanyong Limo incident provides a good example. On 20 September 2005, two marines were captured and killed in the village of Tanyong Limo, Narathiwat province. The villagers had detained the two marines after they had come to the village to investigate a shooting at a tea shop. The marines were killed before a team of officials was able to rescue them and in circumstances which made it diffcult to ascertain who had committed the murders. The villagers denied any involvement in the killings, but then blocked the road and refused to allow Thai journalists or officials to enter, asking instead that foreign reporters be sent in.
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The INC assigned six reporters to cover this incident. The time and effort to investigate an incident such as this is beyond the resources of the majority of stringers, especially when most of them offer their services to a number of media outlets.
27

Too Hot to Handle?
Deception and inaccurate information is a constant problem for journalists covering the conflict in the far south. For instance, in 2008, the televised announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by three men who claimed to be militants turned out to be a hoax, alledgedly engineered by a national politician to further his own agenda. 28 News chiefs in Bangkok are acutely aware that their credibility is on the line, and many of them feel local stringers lack judgement on these kind of issues. Editors prefer, therefore, to let senior journalists take the lead. However, experienced journalists have increasingly been tasked with covering the national political crisis since the ouster of Prime Minister Thaksin in 2006 and the ongoing conflict between "yellow" and "red" shirted protesters. News gathering in the south is time consuming and therefore costly, and these costs cannot be justified because public interest in the conflict has waned, mainly due to the repetitiveness of violent incidents such as shootings, decapitations and roadside bombs. That editors do not give prominent attention to the insurgency is unsurprising given that the Thai media -in keeping with the press around the world -has a tendency to focus on breaking news stories at the expense of other issues. This problem is compounded by the intensely competitive nature of the Thai press. 29 But it is the lack of investigative reporting that has resulted in the south becoming a vicious circle for the press; repetitive coverage of the violence results in falling public interest, and falling public interest means this is less incentive to examine the root causes of the violence. One thing that the Bangkok editors have clearly not been accustomed to do is to try to turn the not very marketable but important issues into interesting ones for their readers -something which Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel argue is an essential element of journalism: reporters "must strive to make the significant interesting and relevant".
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Editors and journalists are also concerned that their coverage of the conflict may be used for political purposes by one side or the other. They are aware that their reporting could be seen as glorifying the activities of the insurgents, and that the media could become a propaganda tool of the militants. 31 As a consequence, some newspaper editors have sought to downplay the intensity of the violence by not publishing explicit images of the carnage while others have refrained from using sensationalist headlines so as not to aggravate the situation. Several media outlets have banned their reporters from quoting militant propaganda leaflets. 32 News chiefs have denied, however, that they have come under pressure from the government to change the way they report the conflict.
The uneasiness of newspaper editors that they have unintentionally become part of the insurgents' propaganda machine have been echoed by the security forces operating in the far south. A study by Sirirath Burinkul notes that the military has lobbied the heads of television channels to play a more "constructive" role in the reportage of the conflict.
33 Sirirath decribes how starting from 2005, the news editors of the major television channels were invited by the military to attend monthly meetings at which the army provided intelligence on the militant's strategy to rally the support of editors on the military's response which has often been criticized for being heavy handed. While Sirirath claims that no pressure was brought to bear on the news editors, the military's appeal to them to adopt the "right direction" was successful in that all the editors interviewed for the study conceded to have exercised a greater degree of self censorship.
Other members of the press have noted, however, that the military has complained to them that their coverage of the insurgency has been unhelpful in quelling the unrest. Military personnel and state officials have often reminded editors that they are Thai citizens who should act in the national interest and not in the interests of the media organizations. Such pressure has come in the form of personal telephone calls and official requests, a tactic that was also employed during the recent political unrest in Bangkok.
34 Faced with such pressure, most editors and journalists have exercised selfcensorship, while some have willingly gone along with requests from the authorities. 35 In the context of the far south, self-censorship and providing official views of the conflict undermines the credibility of the press in the eyes of the local population, and puts the safety of journalists directly at risk.
Conclusion
As the INC initiative highlighted, at the outset of the renewed insurgency, reporters covering the conflict sought out information from all sides in order to present a balanced picture and to understand the structural nature of the problem. However, over time, journalists encountered difficulties which, in some cases, led to biased reporting that closed the door to information from one side or the other. In order to achieve more balance, the media needs a more professional mechanism than the one currently in place which relies primarily on part-time stringers who are starved of resources by a weak system. Moreover, in an environment in which the press has come increasingly to rely on official sources, and prioritizes "marketable" news for a population grown weary of the insurgency and distracted by a national political crisis, the coverage of the conflict has become very predictable. 108-11, 238-40, 250-51. 16 In my capacity as a media advocacy specialist I have talked numerous times to human rights activists working in the far south, such as the Muslim Attorney Council and the Cross Cultural Foundation, all of whom have had difficulties engaging journalists on issues of human rights abuses committed by the military.
17
There have been two incidents in which reporters were injured by a second explosion intended to kill those who went to examine the first blast. In the first incident four local reporters including Maluuding Dteedo reporting for Channel 7, and Ahmad Ramansiriwong of the Daily News were seriously injured from a secondary explosive device in Yala, Information provided by a television reporter who asked not to be named, at a forum discussion on media freedom, 3 May 2010 at the office of Prachatai News website.
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At least two senior editors voiced their concern that sections of the Thai press and journalists took sides in the latest political crisis. Discussion among members of the Thai Journalist Association, Bangkok, 4 May 2010.
